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CLARENCE BROWN v.
GENERAL SERVICE ADMINISTRATION, et al.
(Docket No. 74-768)
Civil rights--Title VII--Federal employees--
Preemption of other remedies by the 1972 extension
of a remedy for employment discrimination to fed-
eral employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the requirement of exhaustion of
administrative remedies under that Act
On writ of certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Decision
below: 507 F. 2d 1300 (1974)
Analysis prepared October 27, 1975, by
Professor Edward F. Sherman, Indiana University
School of Law, Bloomington, Indiana 47401; telephone
(812) 337-4140
Issues
1. Did the 1972 extension of a remedy for
employment discrimination to federal employees
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
preempt existing remedies against federal agencies
and officers under section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. 42 U.S.C. 51981, the mandamus statute,
28 U.S.C. §1361, the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §1346,
an action based on an alleged violation of the
Constitution or federal statutes, 28 U.S.C. S1331,
or the Administrative Procedure Act?
2. Must a federal employee bringing an
employment discrimination action against federal
agencies and officers based on statutes other
than Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
exhaust the administrative remedy of appeal to
the Board of Appeals and Review of the Civil Ser-
vice Commission provided in Title VII?
Background and Significance
In 1972, Congress extended a remedy for
discrimination to federal employees under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under the
amended Title VII, a complaint of discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex,or national
origin is processed according to established
procedures by the agency in which the employee
works. Upon notice of final adverse action by
his agency, the complainant may appeal to the
Board of Appeals and Review of the Civil Service
Commission within 15 days, or bring a civil action
in federal court within 30 days. A complainant
who decides not to appeal to the Civil Service
Commission or misses the short 15-day appeal
period may have difficulty obtaining a lawyer
and filing a civil suit within 30 days. In fact,
Title VII has been amended to expand the period
to file suit to 90 days for private employees, but
not federal employees. A federal employee who,
like the appellant in this case, fails to sue
within 30 days may want to base his suit on other
federal statutory remedies which do not have a
30-day filing requirement. These remedies may
also be more attractive than a Title VII civil
suit, particularly in permitting recovery of back
pay for the full period of discrimination. The
question is whether these remedies are still
available, or whether Congress intended the Title
VII remedy to be exclusive.
In June 1975, the Supreme Court held in
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 9S S. Ct.
1716, that a private employee charging racial
discrimination in employment is not limited to
his Title VII remedy, but may sue under section 1
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 which guarantees
equal rights in the making and enforcing of
contracts. Petitioner seeks to extend that holding
to federal employees. He also seeks a determina-
tion that the other statutory remedies which have
not been so clearly defined in relation to employ-
ment discrimination are open to a federal employee
who did not pursue a Title VII civil action.
If the Court affirms the decision below,
federal employees will be left with Title VII as
the only remedy for employment discrimination.
Given present dissatisfaction with Title VII
procedures, such as the short appeal period and
the pro-agency orientation of the Civil Service
Commission appeal board, the decision will probably
give rise to calls for reform of that Act. If the
Court reverses, federal employees can be expected
to pursue a variety of remedies in the alternative
in civil actions, with the Civil Rights Act of
1866 appearing to hold the most promise. The
courts will have to fashion standards governing
such matters as scope of review and type of re-
lief available in relation to these new remedies,
a process which could result in broader remedies.
The Court's decision,depending upon its ration
ale, might also affect non-federal employees. If
the Court takes a restrictive view of the applica-
bility and scope of the non-Title VII remedies,
their potential as remedial vehicles for all
employees could be curtailed. Conversely, a
favorable rationale on these matters could open
the door to greater availability of these remedies
to all employees.
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Facts
Clarence Blown is.a black employed by the
General-Services Administration (GSA) Regional
Office No. 2 -in New York Cityysihce 1957. He
was last promoted in 1966. When he was referred
for promotion with two white employees in 1970,
one of the whites was promoted. All were rated
highly qualified. In 1971, a white employee was
again selected over him for a promotion, although
he was again rated highly qualified. He filed
a complaint, and, 20 months after filing, was
notified that the agency had found no discrimina-
tion. He did not file an appeal with the appeal
board, and did not file suit until 11 days after
the 30 day period was up. His complaint is based
on five statutes and seeks promotion and back pay.
The district court dismissed the complaint
and the Second Circuit affirmed. The court of
appeals found that non-Title VII remedies have
been preempted by Title VII, based in part upon
a view of sovereign immunity expressed in a
1969 opinion written by Justice Blackmun, who,
wrote the opinion in the Johnson case when he
was on the Eighth Circuit. That case, Gnotta v.
United States, 415 F. 2d 1271, held that a suit
by a federal employee for promotion and back pay
due to racial discrimination was forbidden by
sovereign immunity as necessarily involving expen-
ditures from the Treasury. The Second Circuit
viewed Title VII as a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity preempting other remedies which are
violative of that doctrine. It also found that
the remedy of going to the Civil Service Commission
appeal board must be exhausted prior to suit.
Arguments
For Brown
The "arsenal of independent remedies" which
existed before the 1972 amendment to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 were not repealed. The legisla-
tive history of that amendment indicates that
the intent of Congress was to give federal employ-
ees the same rights concerning employment dis-
crimination as are enjoyed by private employees.
Since Johnson held that Title VII did not repeal
the pre-existing remedy in the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 for private employees, the same should
be true of federal employees. All five of the
statutory remedies constitute express waivers of
sovereign immunity.
The provision allowing suit without appealing
to the Civil Service Commission appeal board was
based on a congressional determination that such
appeals are usually futile, as the board rarely
reverses the agency decision. Exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not required of state
or private employees in employment discrimination
cases under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and
should not be required of federal employees. The
policies to be served by exhaustion are not met
here.
For General Services Administration
Sovereign immunity applies to demands for
promotion and back pay by federal employees, the
relief demanded in this case, and thus the other
remedies are barred by that doctrine. The amended
Title VII is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.
The 30-day filing requirement was an explicit
condition imposed by Congress on that remedy.
Even if overlapping remedies might otherwise
be available to a federal employee, Brown cannot
invoke them because he failed to exhause administra-
tive remedies. Although the usual exhaustion
requirement is relaxed to the extent of permitting
a civil action to be filed within 30 days after
receiving the agency's decision without appealing
to the board, appeal to the board is only excused
if suit is filed within 30 days.
HINES v. ANCHOR MOTOR FREIGHT
(Docket No. 74-1025)
Labor law--Grievance procedures--Duty of
union to represent aggrieved union member fairly
and competently
On writ of certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Argument
scheduled for the week of November 10, 1975
Analysis prepared on October 30, 1975, by
Professor James P. Whyte, Jr., College of William
and Mary, Marshall-Whyte School of Law, Williams-
burg, Virginia 23185; telephone (804) 229-3000
Counsel for Petitioner: Niki Z. Schwartz,
Cleveland, Ohio. Counsel for Respondent: Bernard
S. Goldfarb, Cleveland, Ohio
Issue
Whether laintiffs' damage suit against his
employer and his union brought under section 301
of the Labor-Management Relations Act is barred
by an arbitration award upholding plaintiffs'
discharge from employment, even though the local
union representing plaintiffs breached its duty
of fair representation while processing plaintiffs'
grievance and at the arbitration hearing.
Background and Significance
In 1967, the Supreme Court, in Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 71, recognized that an employee had a cause
of action against both his employer and his union
for an unjust discharge where the union failed to
process a grievance completely through a grie-
vance procedure to arbitration. The employee's
damages were to be prorated among the employer
and the union. In essence, that case tended to
free the employee from the constraints of col-
lective bargaining which sometimes subjugate
individual rights to the collective right as ex-
pressed in union action. Should lines and the
others joining him in the present suit be success-
ful, unions will be held to a degree of competence
in processing grievances and presenting cases at
arbitration, in addition to the responsibility of
taking worthy cases to arbitration. Employers,
too, although blameless in faulty arbitration
proceedings, will be held liable. However, the
Court could decide to avoid the substantive issue
and either remand the case for further factual
determination or decide it on tile narrow procedural
grounds of the propriety of granting a summary
judgment.
Facts
Plaintiffs are a number of former employees
of Anchor Motor Freight. Defendants are Anchor,
Teamsters Local Union 377, and the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters. Plaintiffs were fired
by Anchor for alleged dishonesty--falsifying motel
receipts to obtain expense reimbursements greater
than actually expended.
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